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Abstract
The constant-time programming discipline is an effective
countermeasure against timing attacks, which can lead to
complete breaks of otherwise secure systems. However,
adhering to constant-time programming is hard on its
own, and extremely hard under additional efficiency and
legacy constraints. This makes automated verification of
constant-time code an essential component for building
secure software.
We propose a novel approach for verifying constant-
time security of real-world code. Our approach is able
to validate implementations that locally and intentionally
violate the constant-time policy, when such violations
are benign and leak no more information than the pub-
lic outputs of the computation. Such implementations,
which are used in cryptographic libraries to obtain impor-
tant speedups or to comply with legacy APIs, would be
declared insecure by all prior solutions.
We implement our approach in a publicly available,
cross-platform, and fully automated prototype, ct-verif,
that leverages the SMACK and Boogie tools and verifies
optimized LLVM implementations. We present verifica-
tion results obtained over a wide range of constant-time
components from the NaCl, OpenSSL, FourQ and other
off-the-shelf libraries. The diversity and scale of our ex-
amples, as well as the fact that we deal with top-level
APIs rather than being limited to low-level leaf functions,
distinguishes ct-verif from prior tools.
Our approach is based on a simple reduction of
constant-time security of a program P to safety of a prod-
uct program Q that simulates two executions of P. We
formalize and verify the reduction for a core high-level
language using the Coq proof assistant.
1 Introduction
Timing attacks pose a serious threat to otherwise secure
software systems. Such attacks can be mounted by mea-
suring the execution time of an implementation directly
in the execution platform [23] or by interacting remotely
with the implementation through a network. Notable ex-
amples of the latter include Brumley and Boneh’s key
recovery attacks against OpenSSL’s implementation of
the RSA decryption operation [15]; and the Canvel et
al. [16] and Lucky 13 [4] timing-based padding-oracle
attacks, that recover application data from SSL/TLS con-
nections [38]. A different class of timing attacks exploit
side-effects of cache-collisions; here the attacker infers
memory-access patterns of the target program — which
may depend on secret data — from the memory latency
correlation created by cache sharing between processes
hosted on the same machine [11, 31]. It has been demon-
strated in practice that these attacks allow the recovery of
secret key material, such as complete AES keys [21].
As a countermeasure, many security practitioners mit-
igate vulnerability by adopting so-called constant-time
programming disciplines. A common principle of such
disciplines governs programs’ control-flow paths in order
to protect against attacks based on measuring execution
time and branch-prediction attacks, requiring that paths
do not depend on program secrets. On its own, this charac-
terization is roughly equivalent to security in the program
counter model [29] in which program counter values do
not depend on program secrets. Stronger constant-time
policies also govern programs’ memory-access patterns
in order to protect against cache-timing attacks, requiring
that accessed memory addresses do not depend on pro-
gram secrets. Further refinements govern the operands of
program operations, e.g., requiring that inputs to certain
operations do not depend on program secrets, as the exe-
cution time of some machine instructions, notably integer
division and floating point operations, may depend on the
values of their operands.
Although constant-time security policies are the most
effective and widely-used software-based countermea-
sures against timing attacks [11, 25, 20], writing constant-
time implementations can be difficult. Indeed, doing so
requires the use of low-level programming languages or
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compiler knowledge, and forces developers to deviate
from conventional programming practices. For instance,
the program if b then x := v1 else x := v2 may be re-
placed with the less conventional x := b∗v1+(1−b)∗v2.
Furthermore, the observable properties of a program ex-
ecution are generally not evident from its source code,
e.g., due to optimizations made by compilers or due to
platform-specific behaviours.
This raises the question of how to validate constant-
time implementations. A recently disclosed timing leak
in OpenSSL’s DSA signing [19] procedure demonstrates
that writing constant-time code is complex and requires
some form of validation. The recent case of Amazon’s
s2n library also demonstrates that the deployment of less
rigid timing countermeasures is extremely hard to val-
idate: soon after its release, two patches1 were issued
for protection against timing attacks [3, 5], the second of
which exploits a timing-related vulnerability introduced
when fixing the first. These vulnerabilities eluded both ex-
tensive code review and testing, suggesting that standard
software validation processes are an inadequate defense
against timing vulnerabilities, and that more rigorous anal-
ysis techniques are necessary.
In this work, we develop a unifying formal foundation
for constant-time programming policies, along with a for-
mal and fully automated verification technique. Our for-
malism is parameterized by a flexible leakage model that
captures the various constant-time policies used in prac-
tice, including path-based, address-based, and operand-
based characterizations, wherein program paths, accessed
memory addresses, and operand sizes, respectively, are
independent of program secrets. Importantly, our for-
malism is precise with respect to the characterization of
program secrets, distinguishing not only between public
and private input values, but also between private and
publicly observable output values. While this distinction
poses technical and theoretical challenges, constant-time
implementations in cryptographic libraries like OpenSSL
include optimizations for which paths, addresses, and
operands are contingent not only on public input values,
but also on publicly observable output values. Consid-
ering only input values as non-secret information would
thus incorrectly characterize those implementations as
non-constant-time.
We demonstrate the practicality of our verification tech-
nique by developing a prototype, ct-verif, and evaluat-
ing it on a comprehensive set of case studies collected
from various off-the-shelf libraries such as OpenSSL [25],
NaCl [13], FourQlib [17] and curve25519-donna.2 These
examples include a diverse set of constant-time algorithms
for fixed-point arithmetic, elliptic curve operations, and
symmetric and public-key cryptography. Apart from in-
1See pull requests #147 and #179 at github.com/awslabs/s2n.
2https://code.google.com/p/curve25519-donna/
dicating which inputs and outputs should be considered
public, the verification of our examples does not require
user intervention, can handle existing (complete and non-
modified) implementations, and is fully automated.
One strength of our verification technique is that it is
agnostic as to the representation of programs and could be
performed on source code, intermediate representations,
or machine code. From a theoretical point of view, our
approach to verifying constant-time policies is a sound
and complete reduction of the security of a program P
to the assertion-safety of a program Q, meaning that P
is constant-time (w.r.t. the chosen policy) if and only if
Q is assertion-safe. We formalize and verify the method
for a core high-level language using the Coq proof as-
sistant. Our reduction is inspired from prior work on
self-composition [10, 37] and product programs [40, 9],
and constructs Q as a product of P with itself—each exe-
cution of Q encodes two executions of P. However, our
approach is unique in that it exploits the key feature of
constant-time policies: program paths must be indepen-
dent of program secrets. This allows a succinct construc-
tion for Q since each path of Q need only correspond to
a single control path3 of P— path divergence of the two
executions of P would violate constant-time. Our method
is practical precisely because of this optimization: the
product program Q has only as many paths as P itself,
and its verification can be fully automated.
Making use of this reduction in practice raises the is-
sue of choosing the programming language over which
verification is carried out. On the one hand, to obtain
a faithful correspondence with the executable program
under attacker scrutiny, one wants to be as close as pos-
sible to the machine-executed assembly code. On the
other hand, building robust and sustainable tools is made
easier by existing robust and sustainable frameworks and
infrastructure. Our ct-verif prototype performs verifica-
tion of constant-time properties at the level of optimized
LLVM assembly code, which represents a sweet spot in
the design space outlined by the above requirements.
Indeed, performing verification after most optimization
passes ensures that the program, which may have been
written in a higher-level such as C, preserves the constant-
time policy even after compiler optimizations. Further,
stepping back from machine-specific assembly code to
LLVM assembly essentially supports generic reasoning
over all machine architectures—with the obvious caveat
that the leakage model adopted at the LLVM level captures
the leakage considered in all the practical lower-level
languages and adversary models under study. This is a
reasonable assumption, given the small abstraction gap
between the two languages. (We further discuss the issues
that may arise between LLVM and lower-level assembly
3This is more subtle for programs with publicly observable outputs;
see Section 4.
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code when describing our prototype implementation.)
Finally, our prototype and case studies justify that existing
tools for LLVM are in fact sufficient for our purposes. They
may also help inform the development of architecture-
specific verification tools.
In summary, this work makes the following fundamen-
tal contributions, each described above:
i. a unifying formal foundation for constant-time pro-
gramming policies used in practice,
ii. a sound and complete reduction-based approach to
verifying constant-time programming policies, veri-
fied in Coq, and
iii. a publicly available, cross-platform, and fully au-
tomated prototype implementing this technique on
LLVM code, ct-verif, based on SMACK,
iv. extensive case studies demonstrating the practical
effectiveness of our approach on LLVM code, and
supporting discussions on the wider applicability of
the technique.
We begin in Section 2 by surveying constant-time pro-
gramming policies. Then in Section 3 we develop a no-
tion of constant-time security parameterized over leak-
age models, and in Section 4 we describe our reduction
from constant-time security to assertion safety on product
programs. Section 5 describes our implementation of a
verifier for constant-time leveraging this reduction, and in
Section 6 we study the verification of actual cryptographic
implementations using our method. We discuss related
work in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8.
2 Constant-Time Implementations
We now explain the different flavors of constant-time se-
curity policies and programming disciplines that enforce
them, using small examples of problematic code that arise
repeatedly in cryptographic implementations. Consider
first the C function of Figure 1, that copies a sub-array of
length sub_len, starting at index l_idx, from array in
to array out. Here, len represents the length of array in.
1 void copy_subarray(uint8 *out , const uint8 *in,
uint32 len , uint32 l_idx , uint32 sub_len) {
2 uint32 i, j;
3 for(i=0;j=0;i<len;i++) {
4 if (i >= l_idx) && (i < l_idx + sub_len) {
5 out[j] = in[i]; j++;
6 }
7 }
8 }
Figure 1: Sub-array copy: l_idx is leaked by PC.
Suppose now that the starting addresses and lengths of
both arrays are public. What we mean by this is that, the
user/caller of this function is willing to accept a contract
expressed over the calling interface, whereby the starting
addresses and lengths of both arrays may be leaked to an
attacker, whereas the value of the l_idx variable and the
array contents must not. Then, although the overall exe-
cution time of this function may seem roughly constant
because the loop is executed a number of times that can
be inferred from a public input, it might still leak sensi-
tive information via the control flow. Indeed, due to the
if condition in line 4, an attacker that is able to obtain a
program-counter trace would be able to infer the value of
l_idx. This could open the way to timing attacks based
on execution time measurements, such as the Canvel et
al. [16] and Lucky 13 [4] attacks, or to branch-prediction
attacks in which a co-located spy process measures the
latency introduced by the branch-prediction unit in order
to infer the control flow of the target program [1]. An al-
ternative implementation that fixes this problem is shown
in Figure 2.
1 uint32 ct_lt(uint32 a, uint32 b) {
2 uint32 c = a ^ ((a ^ b) | ((a - b) ^ b));
3 return (0 - (c >> (sizeof(c) * 8 - 1)));
4 }
5
6 void cp_copy_subarray(uint8 *out , const uint8 *in,
uint32 len , uint32 l_idx , uint32 sub_len) {
7 uint32 i, j, in_range;
8 for(i=0;i<sub_len;i++) out[i]=0;
9 for(i=0,j=0;i<len;i++) {
10 in_range = 0;
11 in_range |= ~ct_lt(i,l_idx);
12 in_range &= ct_lt(i,l_idx+sub_len);
13 out[j] |= in[i] & in_range;
14 j = j + (in_range % 2);
15 }
16 }
Figure 2: Sub-array copy: constant control flow but
l_idx is leaked by memory access address trace.
Observe that the control flow of this function is now
totally independent of l_idx, which means that it is con-
stant for fixed values of all public parameters. However,
this implementation allows a different type of leakage
that could reveal l_idx to a stronger class of timing ad-
versaries. Indeed, the memory accesses in line 13 would
allow an attacker with access to the full trace of memory
addresses accessed by the program to infer the value of
l_idx—note that the sequence of j values will repeat at
0 until l_idx is reached, and then increase. This leakage
could be exploited via cache-timing attacks [11, 31], in
which an attacker controlling a spy process co-located
with this program (and hence sharing the same cache)
would measure its own memory access times and try to
infer sensitive data leaked to accessed addresses from
cache hit/miss patterns.
Finally, the program above also includes an additional
potential leakage source in line 14. Here, the value of j is
updated as a result of a DIV operation whose execution
time, in some processors,4 may vary depending on the
4This is a quotation from the Intel 64 and IA-32 architectures ref-
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values of its operands. This line of code might therefore
allow an attacker that can take fine-grained measurements
of the execution time to infer the value of l_idx [25].
There are two possible solutions for this problem: ei-
ther ensure that the ranges of operands passed to such
instructions are consistently within the same range, or
use different algorithms or instructions (potentially less
efficient) whose execution time does not depend on their
operands. We note that, for this class of timing attackers,
identifying leakage sources and defining programming
disciplines that guarantee adequate mitigation becomes
highly platform-specific.
An implementation of the same function that elimi-
nates all the leakage sources we have identified above—
assuming that the used native operations have operand-
independent execution times—is given in Figure 3.
1 uint32 ct_eq(uint32 a, uint32 b) {
2 uint32 c = a ^ b;
3 uint32 d = ~c & (c - 1);
4 return (0 - (d >> (sizeof(d) * 8 - 1)));
5 }
6
7 void ct_copy_subarray(uint8 *out , const uint8 *in,
uint32 len , uint32 l_idx , uint32 sub_len) {
8 uint32 i, j;
9 for(i=0;i<sub_len;i++) out[i]=0;
10 for(i=0;i<len;i++) {
11 for(j=0;j<sub_len;j++) {
12 out[j] |= in[i] & ct_eq(l_idx+j,i);
13 }
14 }
15 }
Figure 3: Constant-time sub-array copy.
It is clear that the trade-off here is one between ef-
ficiency and security and, indeed, constant-time imple-
mentations often bring with them a performance penalty.
It is therefore important to allow for relaxations of the
constant-time programming disciplines when these are
guaranteed not to compromise security. The example of
Figure 4, taken from the NaCl cryptographic library [13]
illustrates an important class of optimizations that arises
from allowing leakage which is known to be benign.
This code corresponds to a common sequence of op-
erations in secure communications: first verify that an
incoming ciphertext is authentic (line 11) and, if so, re-
cover the enclosed message (line 12) cleaning up some
spurious data afterwards (line 13). The typical contract
drawn at the function’s interface states that the secret in-
puts to the function include only the contents of the secret
erence manual: The throughput of “DIV/IDIV r32” varies with the
number of significant digits in the input EDX:EAX and/or of the quotient
of the division for a given size of significant bits in the divisor r32. The
throughput decreases (increasing numerical value in cycles) with in-
creasing number of significant bits in the input EDX:EAX or the output
quotient. The latency of “DIV/IDIV r32” also varies with the significant
bits of the input values. For a given set of input values, the latency is
about the same as the throughput in cycles.
1 int crypto_secretbox_open(unsigned char *m,
2 const unsigned char *c,unsigned long long clen ,
3 const unsigned char *n,
4 const unsigned char *k)
5 {
6 int i;
7 unsigned char subkey [32];
8 if (clen < 32) return -1;
9 crypto_stream_salsa20(subkey ,32,n,k);
10 if (crypto_auth_hmacsha512_verify(c,c+32,clen
-32, subkey)!=0) return -1;
11 crypto_stream_salsa20_xor(m,c,clen ,n,k);
12 for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) m[i] = 0;
13 return 0;
14 }
Figure 4: Verify-then-decrypt: verification result is
publicly observable and can be leaked by control-flow.
key array. Now suppose we ensure that the functions
called by this code are constant-time. Even so, this func-
tion is not constant-time: the result of the verification in
line 11 obviously depends on the secret key value, and it
is used for a conditional return statement.
The goal of this return statement is to reduce the exe-
cution time by preventing a useless decryption operation
when the ciphertext is found to be invalid. Indeed, an
authenticated decryption failure is typically publicly sig-
naled by cryptographic protocols, in which case this bla-
tant violation of the constant-time security policy would
actually not constitute an additional security risk. Put
differently, the potentially sensitive bit of information
revealed by the conditional return is actually benign leak-
age: it is safe to leak it because it will be revealed anyway
when the return value of the function is later made public.
Such optimization opportunities arise whenever the target
application accepts a contract at the function interface that
is enriched with information about publicly observable
outputs, and this information is sufficient to classify the
extra leakage as benign.
The above examples motivate the remainder of the
work in this paper. It is clear that checking the correct
enforcement of constant-time policies is difficult. Indeed,
the programming styles that need to be adopted are very
particular to this domain, and degrade the readability of
the code. Furthermore, these are non-functional proper-
ties that standard software development processes are not
prepared to address. These facts are usually a source of
criticism towards constant-time implementations. How-
ever, our results show that such criticism is largely un-
justified. Indeed, our verification framework stands as
proof that the strictness of constant-time policies makes
them suitable for automatic verification. This is not the
case for more lenient policies that are less intrusive but
offer less protection (e.g., guaranteeing that the total exe-
cution time varies within a very small interval, or that the
same number of calls is guaranteed to be made to a hash
compression function).
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In the next section we formalize constant-time security
following the intuition above, as well as the foundations
for a new formal verification tool that is able to automat-
ically verify their correct enforcement over real-world
cryptographic code.
3 A Formalization of Constant-Time
In order to reason about the security of the code actually
executed after compilation, we develop our constant-time
theory and verification approach on a generic unstructured
assembly language, in Appendix A. In the present section
we mirror that development on a simple high-level struc-
tured programming language for presentational clarity.
We consider the language of while programs, enriched
with arrays and assert/assume statements. Its syntax is
listed in Figure 5. The metavariables x and e range over
program variables and expressions, respectively. We leave
the syntax of expressions unspecified, though assume they
are deterministic, side-effect free, and that array expres-
sions are non-nested.
p ::= skip | x[e1] := e2 | assert e | assume e | p1; p2
| if e then p1 else p2 | while e do p
Figure 5: The syntax of while programs.
Although this language is quite simple, it is sufficient
to fully illustrate our theory and verification technique.
We include arrays rather than scalar program variables
to model constant-time policies which govern indexed
memory accesses. We include the assert and assume
statements to simplify our reduction from the security of a
given program to the assertion-safety of another. Figure 6
lists the semantics of while programs, which is standard.
s′ = s[⟨x,s(e1)⟩ $→ s(e2)]
⟨s, x[e1] := e2⟩ → ⟨s′,skip⟩
s′ = s if s(e) else ⊥
⟨s, assert e⟩ → ⟨s′,skip⟩
s(e) = true
⟨s, assume e⟩ → ⟨s,skip⟩
⟨s, p1⟩ → ⟨s′, p′1⟩
⟨s, p1; p2⟩ → ⟨s′, p′1; p2⟩
⟨s, skip; p⟩ → ⟨s, p⟩
i= 1 if s(e) else 2
⟨s, if e then p1 else p2⟩ → ⟨s, pi⟩
p′ = (p; while e do p) if s(e) else skip
⟨s, while e do p⟩ → ⟨s, p′⟩
Figure 6: The operational semantics of while programs.
All rules are guarded implicitly by the predicate s ̸= ⊥,
and we abbreviate the predicate s(e) = true by s(e).
A state s maps variables x and indices i ∈ N to values
s(x, i), and we write s(e) to denote the value of expression
e in state s. The distinguished error state ⊥ represents
a state from which no transition is enabled. A configu-
ration c = ⟨s, p⟩ is a state s along with a program p to
be executed, and an execution is a sequence c1c2 . . .cn
of configurations such that ci → ci+1 for 0 < i < n. The
execution is safe unless cn = ⟨⊥,_⟩; it is complete if
cn = ⟨_,skip⟩; and it is an execution of program p if
c1 = ⟨_, p⟩. A program p is safe if all of its executions
are safe.
A leakage model L maps program configurations c
to observations L(c), and extends to executions, map-
ping c1c2 . . .cn to the observation L(c1c2 . . .cn) = L(c1) ·
L(c2) · · ·L(cn), where ε is the identity observation, and
L(c) · ε = ε ·L(c) = L(c). Two executions α and β are
indistinguishable when L(α) = L(β ).
Example 1. The baseline path-based characterization of
constant-time is captured by leakage models which expose
the valuations of branch conditions:
⟨s, if e then p1 else p2⟩ $→ s(e)
⟨s, while e do p⟩ $→ s(e)
In this work we assume that all leakage models include
the mappings above.
Example 2. Notions of constant-time which further in-
clude memory access patterns are captured by leakage
models which expose addresses accessed in load and store
instructions. In our simple language of while programs,
this amounts to exposing the indexes to program variables
read and written at each statement. For instance, the as-
signment statement exposes indexes read and written (the
base variables need not be leaked as they can be inferred
from the control flow):
⟨s, x0[e0] := e⟩ $→ s(e0)s(e1) · · · s(en)
where x1[e1], . . . , xn[en] are the indexed variable reads
in expression e (if any exist).
Example 3. Notions of constant-time which are sensitive
to the size of instruction operands, e.g., the operands
of division instructions, are captured by leakage models
which expose the relevant leakage:
⟨s, x[e1] := e2 / e3⟩ $→ S(e2,e3)
where S is some function over the operands of the division
operation, e.g., the maximum size of the two operands.
In Section 2 we have intuitively described the notion
of a contract drawn at a function’s interface; the constant-
time security policies are defined relatively to this con-
tract, which somehow defines the acceptable level of (be-
nign) leakage that can be tolerated. Formally, we capture
these contracts using a notion of equivalence between ini-
tial states (for a set Xi of inputs declared to be public) and
5
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final states (for a set Xo of outputs declared to be publicly
observable), as follows.
Given a set X of program variables, two configurations
⟨s1,_⟩ and ⟨s2,_⟩ are X-equivalent when s1(x, i) = s2(x, i)
for all x ∈ X and i ∈ N. Executions c1 . . .cn and c′1 . . .c′n′
are initially X-equivalent when c1 and c′1 are X-equivalent,
and finally X-equivalent when cn and c′n′ are X-equivalent.
Definition 1 (Constant-Time Security). A program is se-
cure when all of its initially Xi-equivalent and finally
Xo-equivalent executions are indistinguishable.
Intuitively, constant-time security means that any two
executions whose input and output values differ only with
respect to secret information must leak exactly the same
observations. Contrasting our definition with other in-
formation flow policies, we observe that constant-time
security asks that every two complete executions starting
with Xi-equivalent states and ending with Xo-equivalent
final states must be indistinguishable, while termination-
insensitive non-interference asks that every two complete
executions starting with Xi-equivalent states must end
with Xo-equivalent final states. This makes the constant-
time policies we consider distinct from the baseline no-
tions of non-interference studied in language-based se-
curity. However, our policies can be understood as a
specialized form of delimited release [34], whereby es-
cape hatches are used to specify an upper bound on the
information that is allowed to be declassified. Our no-
tion of security is indeed a restriction of delimited release
where escape hatches–our public output annotations–may
occur only in the final state.
4 Reducing Security to Safety
The construction of the output-insensitive product of a
program (with itself) is shown in Figure 7. It begins by
assuming the equality of each public input x ∈ Xi with
its renamed copy xˆ, then recursively applies a guard and
instrumentation to each subprogram. Guards assert the
equality of leakage functions for each subprogram p and
its variable-renaming pˆ.
product(p) assume x=xˆ for x ∈ Xi;
together(p)
together(p) guard(p);
instrument[λ p.(p; pˆ),together](p)
guard(p) assert L(p)=L(pˆ)
Figure 7: Output-insensitive product construction.
Instrumentation preserves the control structure of the
original program. Our construction uses the program
instrumentation given in Figure 8, which is parameter-
ized by functions α and β transforming assignments and
subprograms, respectively. In our constructions, α is ei-
ther the identity function or else duplicates assignments
over renamed variables, and β applies instrumentation
recursively with various additional logics.
_ instrument[α,β ](_)
skip skip
x[e1] := e2 α(x[e1] := e2)
assert e assert e
assume e assume e
p1; p2 β (p1); β (p2)
if e then p1 else p2 if e then β (p1) else β (p2)
while e do p while e do β (p)
Figure 8: Instrumentation for product construction.
Our first result states that this construction provides
a reduction from constant-time security to safety that is
sound for all safe input programs (i.e., a security ver-
dict is always correct) and complete for programs where
information about public outputs is not taken into consid-
eration in the security analysis (i.e., an insecurity verdict
is always correct).
Theorem 1. A safe program with (respectively, without)
public outputs is secure if (respectively, iff) its output-
insensitive product is safe.
Proof. First, note that program semantics is determinis-
tic, i.e., for any two complete executions of a program
p from the same state s0 to states s1 and s2 emitting ob-
servations L(⃗c1) and L(⃗c2), respectively, we have s1 = s2
and L(⃗c1) = L(⃗c2). The product construction dictates that
an execution of product(p) from state sunionmulti sˆ reaches state
s′ unionmulti sˆ′ if and only if the two corresponding executions of
p leak the same observation sequence, from s to s′ and
from sˆ to sˆ′, where sˆ is the variable-renaming of s.
In order to deal with program paths which depend
on public outputs, we modify the product construction,
as shown in Figure 9, to record the observations along
output-dependent paths in history variables and assert
their equality when paths merge. The output-sensitive
product begins and ends by assuming the equality of pub-
lic inputs and outputs, respectively, with their renamed
copies, and finally asserts that the observations made
across both simulated executions are identical. Besides
delaying the assertion of observational indistinguishabil-
ity until the end of execution, when outputs are known
to be publicly observable, this construction allows paths
to diverge at branches which depend on these outputs,
checking whether both executions alone leak the same
recorded observations.
Technically, this construction therefore relies on iden-
tifying the branches, i.e., the if and while statements,
whose conditions can only be declared benign when pub-
lic outputs are considered. This has two key implications.
6
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product(p) same_observations := true;
assume x=xˆ for x ∈ Xi;
together(p);
assume x=xˆ for x ∈ Xo;
assert same_observations
together(p) if benign(p) then
h := ε; h^ := ε;
aloneh(p);
aloneh^( pˆ);
same_observations &&:= h=h^
otherwise
guard(p);
instrument[λ p.(p; pˆ),together](p)
guard(p) same_observations &&:= L(p)=L( pˆ)
aloneh(p) recordh(p);
instrument[λ p.p,aloneh](p)
recordh(p) h +:= L(p)
Figure 9: Output-sensitive product construction
First, it either requires a programmer to annotate which
branches are benign in a public-sensitive sense, or ad-
ditional automation in the verifier, e.g., to search over
the space of possible annotations; in practice the burden
appears quite low since very few branches will need to
be annotated as being benign. Second, it requires the
verifier to consider separate paths for the two simulated
executions, rather than a single synchronized path. While
this deteriorates to an expensive full product construc-
tion in the worst case, in practice these output-dependent
branches are localized to small non-nested regions, and
thus asymptotically insignificant.
Theorem 2. A safe program is secure iff its output-
sensitive product is safe with some benign-leakage an-
notation.
Proof. Completeness follows from completeness of self-
composition, so only soundness is interesting. Soundness
follows from the fact that we record history in the vari-
ables h and h^ whenever we do not assert the equality of
observations on both sides.
Coq formalization The formal framework presented
in this and the previous section has been formalized in
Coq. Our formalization currently includes the output-
insensitive reduction from constant-time security to safety
of the product program as described in Figures 7 and 8, for
the while language in Figure 5. We prove the soundness
and completeness of this reduction (Theorem 1) follow-
ing the intuition described in the sketch presented above.
Formalization of the output-sensitive construction and the
proof of Theorem 2 should not present any additional
difficulty, other than a more intricate case analysis when
control flow may diverge. Our Coq formalization serves
two purposes: i. it rigorously captures the theoretical
foundations of our approach and complements the intu-
itive description we gave above; and ii. it could serve
as a template for a future formalization of the machine-
level version of these same results, which underlies the
implementation of our prototype and is presented in Ap-
pendices A and B. A Coq formalization of this low-level
transformation could be integrated with CompCert, pro-
viding more formal guarantees on the final compiled code.
5 Implementation of a Security Verifier
Using the reduction of Section 4 we have implemented
a prototype, ct-verif, which is capable of automatically
verifying the compiled and optimized LLVM code result-
ing from compiling actual C-code implementations of
several constant-time algorithms. Before discussing the
verification of these codes in Section 6, here we describe
our implementation and outline key issues. Our imple-
mentation and case studies are publicly available5 and
cross-platform. ct-verif leverages the SMACK verification
tool [32] to compile the annotated C source via Clang6
and to optimize the generated assembly code via LLVM7
before translating to Boogie8 code. We perform our re-
duction on the Boogie code, and apply the Boogie verifier
(which performs verification using an underlying SMT9
logic solver) to the resulting program.
5.1 Security Annotations
We provide a simple annotation interface via the following
C function declarations:
void public_in(smack_value_t);
void public_out(smack_value_t);
void benign_branching ();
where smack_value_t values are handles to program
values obtained according to the following interface
smack_value_t __SMACK_value ();
smack_value_t __SMACK_values(void* ary ,
unsigned count);
smack_value_t __SMACK_return_value(void);
and __SMACK_value(x) returns a handle to the value
stored in program variable x, __SMACK_values(ary,n)
returns a handle to an n-length array ary, and
__SMACK_return_value() provides a handle to the pro-
cedure’s return value. While our current interface does
not provide handles to entire structures, non-recursive
structures can still be annotated by annotating the handles
to each of their (nested) fields. Figure 10 demonstrates the
annotation of a decryption function for the Tiny Encryp-
tion Algorithm (TEA). The first argument v is a pointer to
5https://github.com/imdea-software/
verifying-constant-time
6C language family frontend for LLVM: http://clang.llvm.org
7The LLVM Compiler Infrastructure: http://llvm.org
8Boogie: http://github.com/boogie-org/boogie
9Satisfiability Modulo Theories: http://smtlib.cs.uiowa.edu
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a public ciphertext block of two 32-bit words, while the
second argument k is a pointer to a secret key.
1 void decrypt_cpa_wrapper(uint32 _t* v,uint32 _t* k){
2 public_in(__SMACK_value(v));
3 public_in(__SMACK_value(k));
4 public_in(__SMACK_values(v, 2));
5 decrypt(v, k);
6 }
Figure 10: Annotations for the TEA decryption function.
5.2 Reasoning about Memory Separation
In some cases, verification relies on establishing separa-
tion of memory objects. For instance, if the first of two
adjacent objects in memory is annotated as public input,
while the second is not, then a program whose branch
conditions rely on memory accesses from the first object
is only secure if we know that those accesses stay within
the bounds of the first object. Otherwise, if those accesses
might occur within the second object, then the program is
insecure since the branch conditions may rely on private
information.
Luckily SMACK has builtin support for reasoning about
the separation of memory objects, internally leveraging an
LLVM-level data-structure analysis [26] (DSA) to partition
memory objects into disjoint regions. Accordingly, the
generated Boogie code encodes memory as several dis-
joint map-type global variables rather than a single mono-
lithic map-type global variable, which facilitates scalable
verification. This usually provides sufficient separation
for verifying security as well. In a few cases, DSA may
lack sufficient precision. In those settings, it would be pos-
sible to annotate the source code with additional assump-
tions using SMACK ’s __VERIFIER_assume() function.
This limitation is not fundamental to our approach, but
instead an artifact of design choices10 and code rot11 in
DSA itself.
5.3 Product Construction for Boogie Code
The Boogie intermediate verification language (IVL) is a
simple imperative language with well-defined, clean, and
mathematically-focused semantics which is a convenient
representation for performing our reduction. Concep-
tually there is little difference between performing our
shadow product reduction at the Boogie level as opposed
to the LLVM or machine-code level since the Boogie code
produced by SMACK corresponds closely to the LLVM
code, which is itself similar to machine code. Indeed our
machine model of Appendix A is representative. Practi-
cally however, Boogie’s minimal syntax greatly facilitates
10DSA is designed to be extremely scalable at the expense of precision,
yet such extreme scalability is not necessary for our use.
11See the discussion thread at https://groups.google.com/
forum/#!topic/llvm-dev/pnU5ecuvr6c.
our code-to-code translation. In particular, shadowing the
machine state amounts to making duplicate copies of pro-
gram variables. Since memory accesses are represented
by accesses to map-type global variables, accessing a
shadowed address space amounts to accessing the dupli-
cate of a given map-type variable.
Our prototype models observations as in Examples 1
and 2 of Section 3, exposing the addresses used in mem-
ory accesses and the values used as branch conditions as
observations. According to our construction of Section 4,
we thus prefix each memory access by an assertion that
the address and its shadow are equal, and prefix each
branch by an assertion that the condition and its shadow
are equal. Finally, for procedures with annotations, our
prototype inserts assume statements on the equality of
public inputs with their shadows at entry blocks.
When dealing with public outputs, we perform the
output-sensitive product construction described in Sec-
tion 4 adapted to an unstructured assembly language. Intu-
itively, our prototype delays assertions (simply by keeping
track of their conjunction in a special variable) but oth-
erwise produces the standard output-insensitive product
program. It then replaces the blocks corresponding to the
potentially desynchronized conditional with blocks cor-
responding to the output-sensitive product construction
that mixes control and data product. Finally, it inserts
code that saves the current assertions before the region
where the control flow may diverge, and restores them
afterwards, making sure to also take into account the as-
sertions collected in between.
5.4 Scalability of the Boogie Verifier
Since secure implementations, and cryptographic primi-
tives in particular, do not typically call recursive proce-
dures, we instruct Boogie to inline all procedures during
verification. This avoids the need for manually written
procedure contracts, or for sophisticated procedure speci-
fication inference tools.
Program loops are handled by automatically computing
loop invariants. This is fairly direct in our setting, since
invariants are simply conjunctions of equalities between
some program variables and their shadowed copies. We
compute the relevant set of variables by taking the inter-
section of variables live at loop heads with those on which
assertions inserted by our reduction depend.
5.5 Discussion
ct-verif is based on a theoretically sound and complete
methodology; however, practical interpretations of its
results must be analyzed with care. First, leakage models
are constructed, and in our case are based on LLVM
rather than machine code. Second, verification tools can
8
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be incomplete, notably because of approximations made
by sub-tasks performed during verification (for instance,
data-structure analysis or invariant inference).
Therefore, it is important to evaluate ct-verif empiri-
cally, both on positive and negative examples. Our posi-
tive experimental results in the next section demonstrate
that the class of constant-time programs that is validated
automatically by ct-verif is significantly larger than those
tackled by existing techniques and tools. Our negative
examples, available from the public repository,12 are
taken from known buggy libraries (capturing the recent
CacheBleed attack,13 in particular), and others taken to il-
lustrate particularly tricky patterns. Again, some of these
examples illustrate the value of a low-level verification
tool by exhibiting compilation-related behaviours. Unsur-
prisingly, we found that there is little value in running our
tool on code that was notwritten to be constant-time. Con-
versely, we found that our tool can be helpful in detecting
subtle breaches in code that was written with constant-
time in mind, but was still insecure, either due to subtle
programming errors, or to compilation-related issues.
It remains to discuss possible sources of unsoundness
that may arise from our choice of LLVM as the target
for verification (rather than actual machine code). As
highlighted in Section 1, this choice brings us many ad-
vantages, but it implies that our prototype does not strictly
know what machine instructions will be activated and on
which arguments, when the final code is actually executed.
For example, our assumptions on the timing of a particu-
lar LLVM operation may not hold for the actual processor
instruction that is selected to implement this operation in
executable code. Nevertheless we argue that the LLVM
assembly code produced just before code generation suf-
ficiently similar to any target-machine’s assembly code to
provide a high level of confidence. Indeed, the majority
of compiler optimizations are made prior to code genera-
tion. At the point of code generation, the key difference
between representations is that in LLVM assembly:
i. some instruction/operand types may not be available
on a given target machine,
ii. there are arbitrarily-many registers, whereas any
given machine would have a limited number, and
iii. the order of instructions within basic blocks is only
partially determined.
First we note that neither of these differences affects pro-
grams’ control-flow paths, and the basic-block structure
of programs during code generation is generally preserved.
Second, while register allocation does generally change
memory-access patterns, spilled memory accesses are gen-
erally limited to the addresses of scalar stack variables,
which are fully determined by control-flow paths. Thus
12https://github.com/imdea-software/
verifying-constant-time
13https://ssrg.nicta.com.au/projects/TS/cachebleed
both path-based and address-based constant-time prop-
erties are generally preserved. Operand-based constant-
time properties, however, are generally not preserved: it is
quite possible that instruction selection changes the types
of some instruction’s operands, implying a gap between
LLVM and machine assembly regarding whether operand
sizes may depend on secrets. Dealing with such sources
of leakage requires architecture-specific modeling and
tools, which are out of the scope of a research prototype.
6 Experimental Results
We evaluate ct-verif on a large set of examples, mostly
taken from off-the-shelf cryptographic libraries, in-
cluding the pervasively used OpenSSL [25] library,
the NaCl [13] library, the FourQlib library [17], and
curve25519-donna.14 The variety and number of cryp-
tographic examples we have considered is unprecedented
in the literature. Furthermore, our examples serve to
demonstrate that ct-verif outperforms previous solutions
in terms of scale (the sizes of some of our examples are
orders of magnitude larger than what could be handled
before), coverage (we can handle top-level public APIs,
rather than low-level or leaf functions) and robustness
(ct-verif is based on a technique which is not only sound,
but also complete).
All execution times reported in this section were ob-
tained on a 2.7GHz Intel i7 with 16GB of RAM. Size
statistics measure the size in lines of code (loc) of the
analyzed Boogie code (similar in size to the analyzed
LLVM bitcode) before inlining. When presenting time
measurements, all in seconds, we separate the time taken
to produce the product program (annotating it with the ×
symbol) from that taken to verify it: in particular, given a
library, the product program can be constructed once and
for all before verifying each of its entry points. ct-verif as-
sumes that the leakage trace produced by standard library
functions memcpy and memset depends only on their ar-
guments (that is, the address and length of the objects
they work on, rather than their contents). This is a mild
assumption that can be easily checked for each platform.
For examples that use dynamic memory allocation, such
as the OpenSSL implementation of PKCS#1 padding,
ct-verif enforces that malloc and free are called with
secret-independent parameters and assumes that the re-
sult of malloc is always secret-independent in this case.
In other words, we assume that the address returned by
malloc depends only on the trace of calls to malloc and
free, or that the memory allocator observes only the
memory layout to make allocation decisions.15
14https://code.google.com/p/curve25519-donna/
15It may be possible to extend this to an allocator that also has access
to the trace of memory accesses, since they are made public.
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Example Size Time (×) Time
tea 200 2.33 0.47
rlwe_sample 400 5.78 0.65
nacl_salsa20 700 5.60 1.11
nacl_chacha20 10000 8.30 1.92
nacl_sha256_block 20000 27.7 4.17
nacl_sha512_block 20000 39.49 4.29
Table 1: Verification of crypto primitives.
6.1 Cryptographic Primitives
For our first set of examples, we consider a representative
set of cryptographic primitives: a standard implemen-
tation of TEA [39] (tea), an implementation of sam-
pling in a discrete Gaussian distribution by Bos et al. [14]
(rlwe_sample) and several parts of the NaCl library [13]
library.
Table 1 gives the details (we include only a subset of the
NaCl verification results listed as nacl_xxxx). The ver-
ification result for rlwe_sample only excludes its core
random byte generator, essentially proving that this core
primitive is the only possible source of leakage. In partic-
ular, if its leakage and output bytes are independent, then
the implementation of the sampling operation is constant-
time. Verification of the SHA-256 implementation in
NaCl above refers to the compression funcion; the full
implementation of the hash function, which simply iter-
ates this compression function, poses a challenge to our
prototype due to the action of DSA: the internal state of
the function is initialized as a single memory block, that
later stores both secret and public values that are accessed
separately. This issue was discussed in Section 5.2, where
we outlined a solution using assume statements.
6.2 TLS Record Layer
To further illustrate scalability to large code bases, we now
consider problems related to the MAC-then-Encode-then-
CBC-Encrypt (MEE-CBC) construction used in the TLS
record layer to obtain an authenticated encryption scheme.
This construction is well-understood from the perspective
of provable security [24, 30], but implementations have
been the source of several practical attacks on TLS via
timing side-channels [16, 4].
We apply our prototype to two C implementations of
the MEE-CBC decryption procedure, treating only the
input ciphertext as public information. Table 2 shows
the corresponding verification results. We extract the
first implementation from the OpenSSL sources (ver-
sion 0.9.8zg). It includes all the countermeasures against
timing attacks currently implemented in the MEE-CBC
component in OpenSSL as documented in [25]. We ver-
ify the parts of the code that handle MEE-CBC decryp-
tion (1K loc of C, or 10K loc in Boogie): i. decryp-
tion of the encrypted message using AES128 in CBC
Example Time (×) Time
mee-cbc-openssl 10.6 18.73
mee-cbc-nacl 24.64 92.56
Table 2: Verification of MEE-CBC TLS record layer.
mode; ii. removing the padding and checking its well-
formedness; iii. computing the HMAC of the unpadded
message, even for bad padding, and using the same num-
ber of calls to the underlying hash compression function
(in this case SHA-1); and iv. comparing the transmit-
ted MAC to the computed MAC in constant-time. Our
verification does not include the SHA1 compression func-
tion and AES-128 encryption—these are implemened
in assembly—and hence our result proves that the only
possible leakage comes from these leaf functions. (In
OpenSSL the SHA1 implementation is constant-time but
AES-128 makes secret-dependent memory accesses.)
As our second example, we consider a full 800 loc (in
C, 20K loc in Boogie) implementation of MEE-CBC [5],
which includes the implementation of the low level primi-
tives (taken from the NaCl library).
Our prototype is able to verify the constant-time prop-
erty of both implementations–with only the initial cipher-
text and memory layout marked as public. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, our simple heuristic for loop invariants is sufficient
to handle complex control-flow structures such as the one
shown in Figure 11, taken from OpenSSL.
1 k = 0;
2 if (/* low cond */) { k = /* low exp */ }
3 if (k > 0)
4 { for (i = 1; i < k / /* low var */; i++)
5 { /* i-dependent memory access */ }
6 }
7 for (i = /* low var */; i <= /* low var */; i++)
8 { /* i-dependent memory access */
9 for (j = 0; j < /* low var */; j++)
10 { if (k < /* low var */)
11 /* k-dependent memory access */
12 else if (k < /* low exp */)
13 /* k-dependent memory access */
14 k++;
15 }
16 for (j = 0; j < /* low var */; j++)
17 { /* j-dependent memory access */ }
18 }
Figure 11: Complex control-flow from OpenSSL.
6.3 Fixed-Point Arithmetic
Our third set of examples is taken from the
libfixedtimefixedpoint library, developed by
Andrysco et al. [7] to mitigate several attacks due to
operand-dependent leakage in the timing of floating point
operations. In the conclusion of the paper we discuss
how our prototype can be extended to deal with the
vulnerable code that was attacked in [7]. Here we present
10
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Function Size Time
fix_eq 100 1.45
fix_cmp 500 1.44
fix_mul 2300 1.50
fix_div 1000 1.53
fix_ln 11500 2.66
fix_convert_from_int64 100 1.43
fix_sin 800 1.64
fix_exp 2200 1.62
fix_sqrt 1400 1.55
fix_pow 18000 1.4216
Table 3: Verification of libfixedtimefixedpoint.
our verification results over the library that provides an
alternative secure constant-time solution
The libfixedtimefixedpoint library (ca. 4K loc
of C or 40K loc in Boogie) implements a large number
of fixed-point arithmetic operations, from comparisons
and equality tests to exponentials and trigonometric func-
tions. Core primitives are automatically generated para-
metrically in the size of the integer part: we verify code
generated with the default parameters. As far as we know,
this is the first application of verification to this floating
point library.
Table 3 shows verification statistics for part of the li-
brary. We verify all arithmetic functions without any
inputs marked as public, but display only some interest-
ing data points here. We discuss the fix_pow function,
during whose execution the code shown in Figure 12 is
executed on a frac array that is initialized as a “0” string
literal. The function in which this snippet appears is not
generally constant-time, but it is always used in contexts
where all indices of frac that are visited up to and includ-
ing the particular index that might trigger a sudden loop
exit at line 6 contains public (or constant) data. Thanks
to our semantic characterization of constant-time policies,
ct-verif successfully identifies that the leakage produced
by this code is indeed benign, whereas existing type-based
or taint-propagation based would mark this program as
insecure.
1 uint64_t result = 0;
2 uint64_t extra = 0;
3
4 for(int i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
5 uint8 _t digit = (frac[i] - (uint8_t) ’0’);
6 if (frac[i] == ’\0’) { break; }
7 result += (( uint64_t)digit) * pow10[i];
8 extra += (( uint64_t)digit) * pow10_extra[i];
9 }
Figure 12: fix_pow code.
16We manually provide an invariant of the form ∃imax. 0≤ i< imax ≤
20∧ frac[imax] == 0∧∀ j. 0 ≤ j ≤ imax ⇒ public(frac[ j]) for the
loop shown in Figure 12. Loop unrolling could also be used, since the
loop is statically bounded.
Example Size Time (×) Time
curve25519-donna 10000 10.18 456.97
FourQLib - 7.87 -
eccmadd 2500 - 133.72
eccdouble 3000 - 70.67
eccnorm 3500 - 156.48
point_setup 600 - 0.99
R1_to_R2 2500 - 7.92
R5_to_R1 2000 - 1.26
R1_to_R3 2500 - 2.42
R2_to_R4 1000 - 0.93
Table 4: Verification of elliptic curve arithmetic.
6.4 Elliptic Curve Arithmetic
As a final illustrative example of the capabilities of ct-verif
in handling existing source code from different sources,
we consider two constant-time implementations of elliptic
curve arithmetic: the curve25519-donna implementa-
tion by Langley,17 and the FourQlib library [17]. The
former library provides functions for computing essen-
tial elliptic curve operations over the increasingly pop-
ular Curve25519 initially proposed by Bernstein [12],
whereas the latter uses a recently proposed alternative
high-performance curve. Table 4 shows the results.
For curve25519-donna, we verify the functional en-
try point, used to generate public points and shared secrets,
assuming only that the initial memory layout is public.
For FourQLib, we verify all the core functions for point
addition, doubling and normalization, as well as coordi-
nate conversions, all under the only assumption that the
addresses of the function parameters are public. ct-verif
successfully detects expected dependencies of the execu-
tion time on public inputs in the point validation function
ecc_point_validate.
6.5 Publicly Observable Outputs
We wrap up this experimental section by illustrating the
flexibility of the output-sensitive product construction,
and how it permits expanding the coverage of real-world
crypto implementations in comparison with previous ap-
proaches. As a first example we consider an optimized
version of the mee-cbc-nacl example. Instead of using
a constant-time select and zeroing loop to return its re-
sult (as shown in Figure 13, where the return code res
is secret-dependent and marked as public and in_len is
a public input), the code branches on the return code as
shown in Figure 14. (The rest of the code is unmodified,
and therefore constant-time.)
This is similar to the motivating example that we pre-
sented in Section 2, but here the goal is to avoid the
unnecessary cleanup loop at the end of the function in
executions where it is not needed. Again, because the re-
turn code is made public when it is returned to the caller,
17https://code.google.com/p/curve25519-donna/
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1 good = ~((res == RC_SUCCESS) - 1);
2 for(i = 0;i < in_len;i++) { out[i] &= good; }
3 *out_len &= good;
Figure 13: MEE-CBC decryption: constant-time.
1 if (res != RC_SUCCESS) {
2 for(i = 0;i < in_len;i++) { out[i] = 0; }
3 *out_len = 0;
4 }
Figure 14: MEE-CBC decryption: constant-time.
this control-flow dependency on secret information can
be classified as benign leakage. The output-sensitive prod-
uct constructed by our prototype for this example, when
the displayed conditional is annotated as benign leakage,
verifies in slightly less than 2 minutes. The additional
computation cost of verifying this version of the program
may be acceptable when compared to the performance
gains in the program itself—however minor: verification
costs are one off, whereas performance issues in the cryp-
tographic library are paid per execution.
1 int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(uchar *to , int
tlen , const uchar *from , int flen , int num)
2 {
3 int i, zero_index = 0, msg_index , mlen = -1;
4 uchar *em = NULL;
5 uint good , found_zero_byte;
6
7 if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0) return -1;
8 if (flen > num) goto err;
9 if (num < 11) goto err;
10
11 em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);
12 if (em == NULL) return -1;
13 memcpy(em + num - flen , from , flen);
14
15 good = ct_is_zero(em[0]);
16 good &= ct_eq(em[1], 2);
17
18 found_zero_byte = 0;
19 for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
20 uint equals0 = ct_is_zero(em[i]);
21 zero_index = ct_select_int (~ found_zero_byte &
equals0 , i, zero_index);
22 found_zero_byte |= equals0;
23 }
24
25 good &= ct_ge((uint)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
26 msg_index = zero_index + 1;
27 mlen = num - msg_index;
28 good &= ct_ge((uint)(tlen), (uint)(mlen));
29
30 /* We can’t continue in constant -time because we
need to copy the result and we cannot fake
its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
information at the API boundary. */
31 if (!good) { mlen = -1; goto err; }
32 memcpy(to, em + msg_index , mlen);
33
34 err:
35 OPENSSL_free(em);
36 return mlen;
37 }
Figure 15: RSA PKCS1 padding check from OpenSSL
Finally, we present in Figure 15 an RSA PKCS1.5
padding check routine extracted from OpenSSL (simi-
lar code exists in other cryptographic libraries, such as
boringssl18). The developers note the most interesting fea-
ture of this code in the comment on line 30: although this
function is written in the constant-time style, the higher-
level application (here referred to as an API boundary)
does not give this implementation enough information
to continue without branching on data dependent from
secret inputs (here, the contents of from). One way in
which this could be achieved would be for the function
to accept an additional argument indicating some public
bound on the expected message length. The constant-time
techniques described previously in this paper could then
be used to ensure that the leakage depends only on this ad-
ditional public parameter. However, given the constraint
forced upon the implementer by the existing API, the final
statements in the function must be as they are, leading
to (unavoidable and hence) benign leakage. Using our
techniques, this choice can be justified by declaring the
message length returned by the function as being (the
only) public output that is safe to leak. Note that flen,
tlen and num are public, and hence declaring mlen as
a public output provides sufficient information to verify
the control-flow leakage in line 31, and also the accessed
addresses in line 32 as being benign. Verifying the output-
sensitive product program when mlen is marked as a
public output takes under a second.19
This example shows that dealing with relaxations of
the constant-time policies enabled by output-sensitive
API contracts is important when considering functions
that are directly accessible by the adversary, rather than
internal functions meant to be wrapped. Dealing with
these use cases is an important asset of our approach, and
is a problem not considered by previous solutions.
7 Related Work
Product programs Product constructions are a stan-
dard tool in the algorithmic analysis of systems. Prod-
uct programs can be viewed as their syntactic counter-
part. Systematic approaches for defining and building
product programs are considered in [9]. Three instances
of product programs are most relevant to our approach:
self-composition [10] and selective self-composition [37],
which have been used for proving information flow se-
curity of programs, and cross-products [40], which have
been used for validating the correctness of compiler op-
timizations. We review the three constructions below,
obliviating their original purpose, and presenting them
from the perspective of our work.
18https://boringssl.googlesource.com/
19With simple implementations of OPENSSL_zalloc and
OPENSSL_free that wrap standard memory functions.
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The self-composition of a program P is a program Q
which executes P twice, sequentially, over disjoint copies
of the state of P. Self-composition is sound and complete,
in the sense that the set of executions of program Q is in
1-1 bijection with the set of pairs of executions of program
P. However, reasoning about self-composed programs
may be very difficult, as one must be able to correlate the
actions of two parts of program Q which correspond to
the same point of execution of the original program P.
The cross-product Q of a program P coerces the two
copies of P to execute in lockstep, by inserting assert
statements at each branching instruction. Cross-product
is not complete for all programs, because pairs of exe-
cutions of program P whose control-flow diverge result
in an unsafe execution of program Q. As a consequence,
one must prove that Q is safe in order to transfer ver-
ification results from Q to P. However, cross-product
has a major advantage over self-composition: reasoning
about cross-products is generally easier, because the two
parts of program Q which correspond to the same point
of execution of the original program P are adjacent.
Selective self-composition is an approach which alter-
nates between cross-product and self-composition, ac-
cording to user-provided (or inferred for some applica-
tions) annotations. Selective self-composition retains the
soundness and completeness of self-composition whilst
achieving the practicality of cross-product.
Our output-insensitive product construction (Figure 7)
is closely related to cross-product. In particular, Theo-
rem 1 implies that cross-products characterize constant-
path programs. We emphasize that, for this purpose, the
incompleteness of cross-products is not a limitation but a
desirable property. On the other hand, our output-sensitive
product construction (Figure 9) is closely related to selec-
tive self-composition.
Language-based analysis/mitigation of side-channels
Figure 16 summarizes the main characteristics of several
tools for verifying constant-time security, according to the
level at which they carry out the analysis, the technique
they use, their support for public inputs and outputs, their
soundness and completeness, and their usability. ct-verif
is the only one to support publicly observable outputs,
and the only one to be sound, theoretically complete and
practical. Moreover, we argue that extending any of these
tools to publicly observable outputs is hard; in particular,
several of these tools exploit the fact that cryptographic
programs exhibit “abnormally straight line code behav-
ior”, and publicly observable outputs are precisely used to
relax this behavior. We elaborate on these points below.
FlowTracker [33] implements a precise, flow sensitive,
constant-time (static) analysis for LLVM programs. This
tool takes as input C or C++ programs with security anno-
tations and returns a positive answer or a counterexample.
Tool Target Analysis Inputs/ Sound/ Usability
method Outputs Complete
tis-ct C static / / (a)
ABPV [6] C logical / / (b)
VirtualCert x86 static / / (c)
FlowTracker LLVM static / /
ctgrind binary dynamic / /
CacheAudit binary static / / (d)
This work LLVM logical / /
Figure 16: Comparison of different tools. Target indicates
the level at which the analysis is performed. Input/Out-
puts classifies whether the tool supports public inputs and
publicly observable outputs. Usability includes coverage
and automation. (a): requires manual interpretation of
dependency analysis. (b): requires interactive proofs. (c):
requires code rewriting. (d): supports restricted instruc-
tion set.
FlowTracker is incomplete (i.e. rejects secure programs),
and it does not consider publicly observable outputs.
VirtualCert [8] instruments the CompCert certified
compiler [27] with a formally verified, flow insensitive
type system for constant-time security. It takes as input a
C program with security annotations and compiles it to
(an abstraction of) x86 assembly, on which the analysis is
performed. VirtualCert imposes a number of restrictions
on input programs (so off-the-shelf programs must often
be adapted before analysis), is incomplete, and does not
support publicly observable outputs.
ctgrind20 is an extension of Valgrind that verifies
constant-address security. It takes an input a program
with taint annotations and returns a yes or no answer. ct-
grind is neither sound nor complete and does not support
publicly obervable outputs.
tis-ct is an extension of the FramaC platform for ana-
lyzing dependencies in C programs and helping towards
proving constant-time security.21 tis-ct has been used to
analyze OpenSSL. Rather than a verification result, tis-ct
outputs a list of all input regions that may flow into the
leakage trace, as well as the code locations where that
flow may occur. Although this does not directly allow the
verification of adherence to a particular security policy,
we note that checking that the result list is a subset of
public inputs could provide, given an appropriate anno-
tation language, a verification method for public input
policies. Since it relies on a dependency analysis rather
than semantic criteria, tis-ct is incomplete.
Almeida, Barbosa, Pinto and Vieira [6] propose a
methodology based on deductive verification and self-
composition for verifying constant-address security of C
20https://github.com/agl/ctgrind/.
21http://trust-in-soft.com/tis-ct/
13
66 25th USENIX Security Symposium USENIX Association
implementations. Their approach extends to constant-
address security earlier work by Svenningsson and
Sands [36] for constant-path security. This approach does
not consider publicly observable outputs and it does not
offer a comparable degree of automation to the one we
demonstrate in this paper.
CacheAudit [18] is a static analyzer for quantify-
ing cache leakage in a single run of a binary program.
CacheAudit takes as input a binary program (in a lim-
ited subset of 32-bit x86, e.g. no dynamic jump) and a
leakage model, but no security annotation (there is no
notion of public or private, neither for input, nor output).
CacheAudit is sound with respect to a simplified machine
code semantics, rather than to a security policy. However,
it is incomplete.
There are many other works that develop language-
based methods for side-channel security (not necessarily
in the computational model of this paper). Agat [2] pro-
poses a type-based analysis for detecting timing leaks
and a type-directed transformation for closing leaks in an
important class of programs. Molnar, Piotrowski, Schultz
and Wagner [29] define the program counter security
model and a program transformation for making programs
secure in this model. Other works include [28, 35, 41].
8 Conclusion
This paper leaves interesting directions for future work.
We intend to improve ct-verif in two directions. First, we
shall enhance enforcement of more expressive policies,
such as those taking into consideration input-dependent
instruction execution times. The work of Andrysco et
al. [7] shows that variations in the timing of floating point
processor operations may lead to serious vulnerabilities
in non-cryptographic systems. Dealing with such timing
leaks requires reasoning in depth about the semantics of a
program, and is beyond the reach of techniques typically
used for non-interference analysis. Our theoretical frame-
work inherits this ability from self-composition, and this
extension of ct-verif hinges solely on the effort required
to embed platform-specific policy specifications into the
program instrumentation logics of the prototype. As a
second improvement to ct-verif, we will add support for
SSE instructions, which are key to reconciling high-speed
and security, for example in implementing AES [22].
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A Machine-Level Constant-Time Security
In this section we formalize constant-time security poli-
cies at the instruction set architecture (ISA) level. Model-
ing and verification at this low-level captures security of
the actual executable code targeted by attacker scrutiny,
which can differ significantly from the original source
code prior to compilation and optimization. In order to
describe our verification approach in a generic setting,
independently of the computing platform and the nature
of the exploits, we introduce abstract notions of machines
and observations.
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A.1 An Abstract Computing Platform
Formally, a machine M = ⟨A,B,V, I,O,F,T ⟩ consists of
• a set A of address-space names,
• a set B of control-block names, determining the set
K = {fail,halt,spin,next,jump(b) : b ∈ B} of
control codes,
• a set V of values — each address space a ∈ A cor-
responds to a subset Va ⊂ V of values; together,
the address spaces and values determine the set
S = A → (Va→V ) of states, each s ∈ S mapping
a ∈ A to value store sa : Va → V ; we write a:v to
denote a reference to sa(v),
• a set I of instructions — operands are references a:v,
block names b ∈ B, and literal values,
• a set O of observations, including the null observa-
tion ε ,
• a leakage function F : S× I → O determining the
observation at each state-instruction pair, and
• a transition function T : S× I → S×K from states
and instructions to states and control codes.
We assume that the value set V includes the integer value
0 ∈ N, that the control-block names include entry, and
that the instruction set I includes the following:
T (s,assume a:v) =
{ ⟨s,spin⟩ if sa(v) = 0
⟨s,next⟩ otherwise
T (s,assert a:v) =
{ ⟨s,fail⟩ if sa(v) = 0
⟨s,next⟩ otherwise
T (s,goto b) = ⟨s,jump(b)⟩
T (s,halt) = ⟨s,halt⟩
We write s[a:v1 '→ v2] to denote the state s′ identical to s
except that s′a(v1) = v2.
Programs are essentially blocks containing instructions.
Formally, a location ℓ = ⟨b,n⟩ is a block name b ∈ B
and index n ∈ N; the location ⟨entry,0⟩ is called the
entry location, and L denotes the set of all locations. The
location ⟨b,n⟩ is the next successor of ⟨b,n−1⟩ when
n> 0, and is the start of block b when n= 0. A program
for machine M is a function P : L→ I labeling locations
with instructions.
A.2 Semantics of Abstract Machines
A configuration c= ⟨s,ℓ⟩ of machine M consists of a state
s ∈ S along with a location ℓ ∈ L, and is called
• initial when ℓ is the entry location,
• failing when T (s,P(ℓ)) = ⟨_,fail⟩,
• halting when T (s,P(ℓ)) = ⟨_,halt⟩, and
• spinning when T (s,P(ℓ)) = ⟨_,spin⟩.
The observation at c is F(s,P(ℓ)), and configuration
⟨s2,ℓ2⟩ is the successor of ⟨s1,ℓ1⟩ when T (s1,P(ℓ1)) =
⟨s2,k⟩ and
• k = next and ℓ2 is the next successor of ℓ1,
• k = jump(b2) and ℓ2 is the start of block b2, or
• k = spin and ℓ2 = ℓ1.
We write c1 → c2 when c2 is the successor of c1, and C
denotes the set of configurations.
An execution of program P for machine M is a con-
figuration sequence e = c0c1 . . . ∈ (C∗ ∪Cω) such that
ci−1 → ci for each 0< i< |e|, and c|e|−1 is failing or halt-
ing if |e| is finite, in which case we say that e is failing
or halting, respectively. The trace of e is the sequence
o0o1 . . . of observations of at c0c1 . . . concatenated, where
o · ε = ε ·o= o. Executions with the same trace are indis-
tinguishable.
Definition 2 (Safety). A program P on machine M is safe
when no executions fail. Otherwise, P is unsafe.
A.3 Constant-Time Security
To define our security property we must relate program
traces to input and output values, since, generally speak-
ing, the observations made along executions should very
well depend on, e.g., publicly-known input values. Se-
curity thus relies on distinguishing program inputs and
outputs as public or private. We make this distinction
formally using address spaces, supposing that machines
include
• a public input address space i ∈ A, and
• a publicly observable output address space o ∈ A,
in addition to, e.g., register and memory address spaces.
Intuitively, the observations made on a machine run-
ning a secure program should depend on the initial ma-
chine state only in the public input address space; when
observations depend on non-public inputs, leakage oc-
curs. More subtly, observations which are independent of
public inputs can still be made, so long as each differing
observation is eventually justified by differing publicly ob-
servable output values. Otherwise we consider that leak-
age occurs. Formally, we say that that two states s1,s2 ∈ S
are a-equivalent for a ∈ A when s1(a)(v) = s2(a)(v) for
all v∈Va. Executions e1 from state s1 and e2 from state s2
are initially a-equivalent when s1 and s2 are a-equivalent,
and finite executions to s′1 and s′2 are finally a-equivalent
when s′1 and s′2 are a-equivalent.
Definition 3 (Constant-Time Security). A program is se-
cure when:
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1. Initially i-equivalent and finally o-equivalent execu-
tions are indistinguishable.
2. Initially i-equivalent infinite executions are indistin-
guishable.
Otherwise, P is insecure.
The absence of publicly observable outputs simplifies
this definition, since the executions of public-output-free
programs are finally o-equivalent, trivially.
B Reducing Security to Safety
According to standard notions, security is a property over
pairs of executions: a program is secure so long as exe-
cutions with the same public inputs and public outputs
are indistinguishable. In this section we demonstrate a
reduction from security to safety, which is a property over
single executions. The reduction works by instrumenting
the original program with additional instructions which
simulate two executions of the same program side-by-
side, along the same control locations, over two separate
address spaces: the original, along with a shadow of the
machine state. In order for our reduction to be sound,
i.e., to witness all security violations as safety violations,
the control paths of the simulated executions must not di-
verge unless they yield distinct observations — in which
case our reduction yields a safety violation. This sound-
ness requirement can be stated via the following machine
property, which amounts to saying that control paths can
be leaked to an attacker.
Definition 4 (Control Leaking). A machine M is control
leaking if for all states s ∈ S and instructions i1, i2 ∈ I the
transitions T (s, i1) = ⟨_,k1⟩ and T (s, i2) = ⟨_,k2⟩ yield
the same control codes k1 = k2 whenever the observations
F(s, i1) = F(s, i2) are identical.
For the remainder of this presentation, we suppose that
machines are control leaking. This assumption coincides
with that of Section 4: all considered leakage models
expose the valuations of branch conditions. Besides con-
trol leaking, our construction also makes the following
modest assumptions:
• address spaces can be separated and renamed, and
• observations are accessible via instructions.
We capture the first requirement by assuming that pro-
grams use a limited set A1 ⊂ A of the possible address-
space names, and fixing a function α : A1 → A2 whose
range A2⊂A is disjoint from A1. We then lift this function
from address-space names to instructions, i.e., α : I→ I,
by replacing each reference a:v with α(a):v. We capture
the second requirement by assuming the existence of a
function β : I×A×V → I such that
T (s,β (i,a,v)) = ⟨s[a:v '→ F(s, i)],next⟩.
For a given instruction i ∈ I, address space a ∈ A, and
value v ∈ V , the instruction β (i,a,v) stores the observa-
tion F(s, i) in state s ∈ S at a:v.
Following the development of Section 4, we develop an
output-insensitive reduction which is always sound, but
complete only for programs without publicly-annotated
outputs. The extension to an output-sensitive reduction
which is both sound and complete for all programs mir-
rors that developed in Section 4. This extension is a
straightforward adaptation of Section 4’s from high-level
structured programs to low-level unstructured programs,
thus we omit it here.
Assume machines include a vector-equality instruction
T (s,eq ax :⃗x ay :⃗y a:z) = ⟨s[a:z '→ v],next⟩
where x⃗ and y⃗ are equal-length vectors of values, and
v= 0 iff s(ax)(xn) ̸= s(ay)(yn) for some 0≤ n< |⃗x|. This
requirement is for convenience only; technically only a
simple scalar-equality instruction is necessary.
To facilitate the checking of initial/final range equiv-
alences for security annotations we assume that a given
program P has only a single halt instruction, and
P(entry,0) = goto b0
P(exit,0) = halt.
This is without loss of generality since any program can
easily be rewritten in this form. Given the above functions
α and β , and a fresh address space a, the shadow product
of a program P is the program P× defined by an entry
block which spins unless the public input values in both i
and α(i) address spaces are equal,
P×(entry,n) =
⎧⎨⎩ eq i:Vi α(i):Vi a:x n= 0assume a:x n = 1
goto b0 n> 1
an exit block identical to the original program,
P×(exit,n) = P(exit,n)
and finally a rewriting of every other block b ̸∈
{entry,exit} of P to run each instruction on two sepa-
rate address spaces,
P×(b,n) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
β (i,a,x) n= 0 (mod 6)
β (α(i),a,y) n= 1 (mod 6)
eq a:x a:y a:z n= 2 (mod 6)
assert a:z n= 3 (mod 6)
i n= 4 (mod 6)
α(i) n= 5 (mod 6)
where i= P(b,n/6)
while asserting that the observations of each instruction
are the same along both simulations.
Theorem 3. A safe program P with (respectively, without)
public outputs is secure if (respectively, iff) P× is safe.
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